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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
HAMM V. CITY OF ROCK HILL: OUT OF THE FRYING PAN
379 U.S. 306 (1964)
A recent comment on the progress of civil rights litigation began with
the observation:
The sit-in cases of 1964, like the sit-in cases of 1963, gave
no answer to one of this nation's most troublesome constitutional
questions: To what extent does the Fourteenth Amendment forbid
the states to support private choice; when under the Constitution
that choice could not be made by the state itself through its
judiciary, its legislature, or its executive?1
The article later noted:
On the day of the decision in Bell, the Court granted certiorari
in two additional sit-in cases, Harm v. City of Rock Hill and
Luppe [sic] v. Arkansas. They seem to present the main issue
squarely.2
The issue, although squarely presented, was once again avoided. But
in the process a new issue of constitutional law was decided: For the
first time the common law rule of abatement of crimes was held to apply
through the impact of a civil statute of one sovereignty on the criminal
statute of another sovereignty.
On June 7, 1960, petitioner in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, and a
companion entered a variety store, and, after making purchases in other
parts of the store, seated themselves at the lunch counter. Service was
denied, and petitioner and his companion were asked to leave. When they
refused, the police were called, and the two were arrested. They were con-
victed under the South Carolina trespass laws,3 and the convictions were
affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court.4 In Lupper v. Arkansas, a
companion case to Harm, petitioners were arrested for participating in
a sit-in demonstration. A group of Negroes had entered a department
store, seated themselves at the lunch counter, and requested service. This
group too was asked to leave. They refused, police were summoned, and
1 Paulsen, "The Sit-in Cases of 1964: But Answer Came There None," in
Supreme Court Review 137 (1964).
2 Id. at 169. (Footnotes omitted.) The reference to Bell is to Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226 (1964), to be discussed later. Certiorari was granted in Haem v. City
of Rock Hill, 377 U.S. 988 (1964) ; and in Lupper v. Arkansas, 377 U.S. 989 (1964).
3 S.C. Code § 16-388 (1962).
4 City of Rock Hill v. Hamm, 241 S.C. 420, 128 S.E2d 907 (1962).
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petitioners were arrested. They were convicted of refusal to leave a business
establishment after request,5 which convictions were affirmed." The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in each case.7 Six separate opinions were written
resulting in a reversal of the trespass convictions by a five-to-four majority.
Harem is both an innovation in the law and a natural product of its
decisional environment. It emerges from a stream of troubled waters,
beset, on the one hand, by the call for a constitutional principle that would
sweep away the injustice and human derogation that the Black Codes
fathered and the Civil Rights Cases8 nurtured; and, on the other hand,
by the admonitions that such a principle would lead to the demise of
property as the Anglo-American foundation of liberty or, at a minimum, to
an unwise balance between significant interest groups. The Court, how-
ever, avoided the constitutional dilemma posed by the conflict of human
rights with property rights. The Court decided that the Civil Rights Act
of 19649 abated the convictions because the act removed the crime and in
its place created a right.
The conflict between viable state criminal statutes and a federal civil
statute was resolved in favor of the federal authority via the supremacy
clause. This was not a case of the same act's giving rise to both state and
federal criminal liability where state and federal activity can coexist in
harmony.10 Nor was it a case of a state statute's coming into conflict with
the preexisting superior rights of the federal government, where the state
regulation must always give way to federal regulation-as in the area of
interstate commerce.1 1 Rather, Harem involves the intrusion of federal
regulation into an area which historically belongs tG the states-the pro-
tection of private property through the use of trespass statutes.
The question of timing is central to the problem, as it is the state's
policy and regulation which are preexisting, not the federal policy. A first
reaction to a state-federal conflicts problem yields a perhaps natural con-
clusion that federal preemption will dissipate all conflicting state action;
for when the federal government enters a proper field, inconsistent state
policy, though existing prior to that occupation, must fall. The Civil Rights
Act, however, does not involve preemption. The state statutes are not
invalidated; rather, they continue to exist. This is the case of a federal
statute tangentially touching and brushing aside a specific application of
an otherwise valid state statute.
The import of what the court did in Hamm can best be grasped after
an examination of the total context into which Harm injects itself.
5 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1433 (1964).
0 Lupper v. Arkansas, 236 Ark. 596, 367 S.W.2d 750 (1963).
7 Harem v. City of Rock Hill, 377 U.S. 988 (1964); Lupper v. Arkansas, 377
U.S. 989 (1964).
8 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9 78 Stat. 244 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1964).
10 See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
11 See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419 (1827). The fact that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is also a commerce clause statute will be commented upon
later.
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Southern attempts to keep intact the humiliating policy of segregation
through use of breach of the peace statutes met with failure before an
undivided court.' 2 The Southern justification for arrests under such
statutes was that the mere presence of Negroes in places of segregation
would move onlookers to violence and thus constitute a breach of the
peace.' 3 Such convictions were reversed for lack of evidence in Garner v.
Louisiana14 and Barr v. City of Columbia.'5 Finally, in Wright v. Georgia,
such arrests were held violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment 6 and also violative of the due process clause for
failure to give fair warning ' 7 because they were unconstitutionally vague.'5
Trespass convictions fared differently. Though all such convictions
were reversed, it was no longer a matter for consensus.1 9 The 1963 civil
rights cases2 0 represented searches for state action. In Peterson v. City of
Greenville,21 the existence of a city ordinance requiring restaurants to
maintain separate facilities and, in Lombard v. Louisiana,22 public state-
ments of the mayor and superintendent of police were found by the Court
to satisfy the requirement of state action necessary to violate the equal
protection clause 2 3 The quest for state action was also carried on in the
1964 civil rights cases. In Griffin v. Maryland,24 a park employee who had
been deputized as a sheriff was found acting in a state capacity in arresting
Negroes for trespassing. The convictions thus violated the equal protection
clause. A Florida Board of Health regulation requiring separate toilet
facilities was enough state participation to reverse trespass convictions in
12 There were however, opinions concurring in result but for reasons other than
the Court relied on; in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176 (1961), Mr. Justice
Douglas set forth his state-action-through-custom theory, which will be discussed
later; in Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964), the Court was unanimous
as to reversal of the breach of the peace convictions; in Wright v. Georgia, 373
U.S. 284 (1963), the Court unanimously reversed convictions as unconstitutionally
vague.
13 368 U.S. at 171.
14 368 U.S. at 163.
1" 378 U.S. at 151.
16 373 U.S. at 292.
17 373 U.S. at 293.
18 373 U.S. at 292.
19 In Barr v. City of Columbia, supra note 12, Mr. Justice Black wrote the
opinion for a unanimous Court reversing the breach of peace convictions and also
wrote a dissenting opinion to the per curiam reversal of the trespass conviction. There
were five opinions altogether: a majority opinion, a per curiamn opinion, two concur-
ring opinions, and a dissent
20 See generally Lewis, "The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations," in Supreme
Court Review 101 (1963).
21 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
22 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
23 See also Gover v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963), and Avent v.
North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963), which were reversed on the basis of City of
Greenville.
24 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
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Robinson v. Florida.25 Bouie v. City of Columbia20 represented a shift of
position by the Court. The Court did not reach the equal protection argu-
ment, but rather decided that the South Carolina Supreme Court's con-
struction of a state statute, which defined trespass as "entry upon the lands
of another . . .after notice,"'27 to include remaining on lands after being
requested to leave, denied fair warning to the petitioners and thus violated
the due process clause.
28
Due process had not been used much in the civil rights area in striking
down discriminatory practices. 29 Perhaps Bouie represented to Justices
Goldberg and Douglas a new willingness on the part of the Court to listen
to due process type objections to convictions under state trespass laws
designed to maintain segregation. Such objections would point toward a
constitutional principle that would do more than merely diffuse the impact
of a state statute, leaving intact the basic statute, as is the effect of the
equal protection clause; it would extirpate the statute and discredit the
policy behind the law. The privileges and immunities clause, which, like
the due process clause, uproots and expunges the challenged statute, was
the weapon that they chose.3 0
25 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
26 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
27 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-386 (1962).
28 The trespass convictions in Barr v. City of Columbia, supra note 12, were
reversed per curiam on the basis of Bouje.
29 In Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), the Court bypassed both equal
protection and due process arguments to void convictions by statutory construction.
In Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), the Court again declined to reach the
constitutional questions- reversing convictions for lack of evidence-as the Court did
in Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964). In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
130 (1964), the trespass convictions in Barr v. City of Columbia, supra; Robinson v.
Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) ; and in Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963),
and Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), the equal protection clause
was used. In Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963), convictions were reversed as
violating both clauses, the due process infirmity, as in Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1964), being lack of fair warning.
30 Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949), stated the case for preference of the equal protection
clause when the facts demonstrate violation of the fourteenth amendment:
There are two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which this Court
may invoke to invalidate ordinances by which municipal governments seek to
solve their local problems ....
The burden should rest heavily upon one who would persuade us to use
the due process clause to strike down a substantive law or ordinance. Even its
provident use against municipal regulations frequently disables all government
-state, municipal and federal-from dealing with the conduct in question
because the requirement of due process is also applicable to State and Federal
Government. Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process grounds
leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many people find objec-
tionable ....
Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does not
disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It
merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact.
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Mr. Justice Douglas took the opportunity offered by the shift from
equal protection to due process in a separate opinion in Bell v. Maryland,31
to offer the discrimination-obliterating theory 2 that the right to be served
in places of public accommodations is an attribute of national citizenship, a3
and that a place of public accommodation, though private property, is
private property affected with a public interest.3 4 Justice Douglas de-
termined that:
Apartheid, however, is barred by the common law as respects
innkeepers and common carriers . . . . Why then . . . in the
absence of a statute, should apartheid be give constitutional sanc-
tion in the restaurant field? . . . Constitutionally speaking, why
should Hooper Food Co., Inc., or Peoples Drug Stores--or any
other establishment that dispenses food or medicines-stand on a
higher, more sanctified level than Greyhound Bus when it comes
to a constitutional right to pick and choose its customers? . . .
The duty of common carriers to carry all, regardless of race,
creed, or color, was in part the product of the inventive genius of
judges . . . We should make that body of law the common law
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments so to speak.
Restaurants in the modern setting are as essential to travelers as
inns and carriers.3 5
Mr. Justice Douglas' call for a constitutional principle to uproot discrimi-
nation in this field was an admixture of the privileges and immunities
clause and the due process clause. What the Justice could not protect
as a privilege or immunity under the Slaughter-house Cases36 could be
sheltered in the name of substantive due process. 37
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Govern-
ment must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their
inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the
object of regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers
of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable govern-
ment than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose
upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the
door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape
the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers
were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be
just than to require that laws be equal in operation.
31 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
32 Mr. Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964), which upheld the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 on the basis of the commerce clause only: "[A Fourteenth Amendment] con-
struction would put an end to all obstructionist strategies and finally close one door
on a bitter chapter in American history."
83 378 U.S. at 249.
34 378 U.S. at 252.
35 378 U.S. at 254-55.
36 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 273 (1869).
37 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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Mr. Justice Black also wished to discuss the wisdom of using due
process extirpation as against equal protection's simple proscription. In
his dissenting opinion in Bell, Mr. Justice Black admonished that the
course Mr. Justice Douglas would pursue would have ominous results:
It would betray our whole plan for a tranquil and orderly society
to say that a citizen, because of his personal prejudices, habits,
attitudes, or beliefs, is cast outside the law's protection and cannot
call for the aid of officers sworn to uphold the law and preserve the
peace. The worst citizen no less than the best is entitled to equal
protection of the laws of his State and of his Nation. None of our
past cases justifies reading the Fourteenth Amendment in a way
that might well penalize citizens who are law-abiding enough to
call upon the law and its officers for protection instead of using
their own physical strength or dangerous weapons to preserve
their rights.88
Justices Douglas and Black thus stated the issue-to what extent
does the fourteenth amendment forbid the states to support private choice-
and resolved it contrarily. The manner in which the majority,8 9 however,
disposed of Bell was, in a sense, a paradigm for Harm six months later.
In Bell twelve Negro students were arrested for staging a sit-in in a
restaurant in Baltimore in 1960. Their conviction for criminal trespass
was affirmed by Maryland's highest court on January 9, 1962. On June
8, 1962, the City of Baltimore enacted a public accommodations ordinance 0
effective on the date of its enactment. On March 29, 1963, the Maryland
Legislature adopted a public accommodations law41 to be effective June 1,
1963, making it unlawful for the owner or operator of a place of public
accommodation to refuse to serve persons because of race, color, or national
origin. As in Hamm, the Negroes were arrested and convicted, and the
convictions affirmed before the intervention of a civil rights statute. In
Bell, of course, the intervening statutes were state, not federal, laws. The
Court noted that the convictions were not final because they were still
on review in the United States Supreme Court.4 The Court vacated the
convictions and remanded the case because:
[U]nder the common law of Maryland, the supervening enactment
of these statutes abolishing the crime for which petitioners were
convicted would cause the Maryland Court of Appeals at this
time to reverse the convictions and order the indictments dis-
missed. For Maryland follows the . . . common-law rule that
38 378 U.S. at 327-28.
39 There were four opinions expressed. Mr. Justice Douglas did not join in the
Court's remand but rather desired to reverse and dismiss the convictions. Mr. Justice
Goldberg concurring with Mr. Justice Douglas concurred with the Court's decision
to remand and wrote a concurring opinion of his own. Mr. Justice Black, with whom
Justices White and Harlan concurred, wrote a dissenting opinion.
40 Baltimore City Code (1950 ed.) art. 14a, § 10A (Ordinance No. 1249).
41 Maryland Ann. Code art. 49B, § 11 (Supp. 1964).
42 378 U.S. at 232.
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when the legislature repeals a criminal statute or otherwise
removes the state's condemnation from conduct which was for-
merly deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a
pending criminal proceeding charging such conduct. The rule ap-
plies to any such proceeding, which, at the time of the supervening
legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest
court authorized to review it.
43
The Maryland saving clause statute44 which saves convictions from com-
mon law abatement when a later statute is enacted repealing the crime was
thought to be inapplicable to the convictions in Bell since:
by its terms . . . it applies only to the "repeal," "repeal and
re-enactment," "revision," "amendment," or "consolidation" of
any statute ... [but] the effect wrought upon the criminal tres-
pass convictions by the supervening public accommodations laws
would seem to be properly described by none of these terms. 45
The constitutional question was thus avoided in Bell and the decisional
environment in which Hamm was decided was near completion. There
43 378 U.S. at 230. (Emphasis added.) The Court next quoted at length from
a Maryland decision which is one of the best explanations of the common law rule
of abatement, Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322, 325-27 (1858) :
It is well settled that a party cannot be convicted, after the law under which
he may be prosecuted has been repealed, although the offense may have
been committed before the repeal .... The same principle applies where the
law is repealed, or expires pending an appeal or writ of error from the
judgment of an inferior court .... The judgment in a criminal cause cannot
be considered as final and conclusive to every intent, notwithstanding the
removal of the record to a superior court. If this were so, there would be
no use in taking the appeal or suing the writ of error ... . And so if the
law be repealed, pending the appeal or writ of error, the judgment will be re-
versed, because the decision must be in accordance with the law at the time
of final judgment.
378 U.S. at 230-31.
44 Maryland Ann. Code art. 1, § 3 (1957):
The repeal, or the repeal and re-enactment, or the revision, amendment or
consolidation of any statute, or of any section or part of a section of any
statute, civil or criminal, shall not have the effect to release, extinguish, alter,
modify or change, in whole or in part, any penalty, forfeiture or liability,
either civil or criminal, which shall have been incurred under such statute,
section or part thereof, unless the repealing, repealing and re-enacting, re-
vising, amending or consolidating act shall expressly so provide; and such
statute, section or part thereof, so repealed, repealed and re-enacted, revised,
amended or consolidated, shall be treated and held as still remaining in force
for the purpose of sustaining any and all proper actions, suits, proceedings or
prosecutions, civil or criminal, for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture
or liability, as well as for the purpose of sustaining any judgment, decree or
order which can or may be rendered, entered or made in such actions, suits,
proceedings or prosecutions imposing, inflicting, or declaring such penalty,
forfeiture or liability.
45 378 U.S. at 233.
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was a further development, however, when the Court, in Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States,48 held the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a constitutional
exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause. The act granted
the right to all persons to be served in places of public accommodation
free from discrimination and segregation. 47 The act declared further:
Sec. 203. No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to with-
hold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any
right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b) intimidate,
threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce
any person with the purpose of interfering with any right or
privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish or attempt
to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any
right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202.48
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 intervened in Hamm after the state
convictions had been affirmed by the highest state court, just as the Mary-
land public accommodations law and the Baltimore ordinance intervened in
Bell after convictions had been affirmed. But, unlike Bell, this was a
federal statute intervening upon a state trespass statute, not local legislation
displacing earlier local legislation. There would be no reason to remand
to the state court for consideration; the Supreme Court had to construe
this federal act. There was no doubt as to trespass convidtions arising
after the act because sit-in demonstrators arrested for trespass now may
clearly rely on the protection of section 203. But the question was what to
do with past convictions. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a commerce
clause statute, and Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Hamm, asked the
question: How can past convictions place any burden on present interstate
commerce? The answer is clearly that they cannot. Therefore, if the
convictions were to be reversed, retroactive application of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 seemed unavoidable.
The problems inherent in retroactive application, however, are avoided
once it is recognized that until the Supreme Court disposes of the case,
46 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
47 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964):
Sec. 201 (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations
of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without dis-
crimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin.
78 Stat. 244 (1964), 42 U.S.C. 2000a-1 (1964):
Sec. 202. All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or
place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin, if such discrimination or segregation is or
purports to be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule or
order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.
48 78 Stat. 244 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
49 379 U.S. at 325.
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that is, while the convictions are on direct review ° in the Supreme Court,
the case is still pending.5' The fact that the convictions were pendent until
the Supreme Court acted does not provide an answer to Mr. justice
Harlan's question, but the pendency of the convictions does shift the
manner in which the Court can look at the effect the Civil Rights Act
wrought upon these convictions. It is not simply a matter of delineating
commerce clause criteria, rather the focus is upon the Civil Rights Act as
a federal statute intervening upon state law, giving rise to the question of
federal supremacy. The Civil Rights Act is not simply a commerce clause
statute in this context, rather it can be viewed more abstractly as a federal
statute conflicting with state law interpretation. The majority used the
common law rule of abatement, just as it had suggested the Maryland court
might on remand in Bell, and the supremacy clause to effect the reversal.
ABATEMENT
The federal common law rule of abatement was announced by Chief
Justice Marshall in United States v. The Schooner Peggy: 2
It is in general, true, that the province of an appellate court is
only to inquire whether a judgment, when rendered, was erroneous
or not. But if, subsequent to the judgment, and before the decision
of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the
rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation
denied. If the law be constitutional, and of that no doubt in the
present case has been expressed, I know of no court which can
contest its obligation. It is true that in mere private cases between
individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a con-
struction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights
of parties, but in great national concerns, where individual rights
acquired by war, are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract
making the sacrifice ought always receive a construction conform-
ing to its manifest import; and if the nation has given up the
vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court but for the
government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compen-
sation. In such a case, the court must decide according to existing
laws and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when
rendered, but which cannot be affirmed, but in violation of law, the
judgment must be set aside.5 3
The United States also has a saving statute saving crimes committed
before the repeal of the statute by later legislation which intervenes while
50 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 232.
51 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503, 505 (1912).
52 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
53 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110. Compare these words of Chief justice Marshall
with the Maryland expression of the common law rule in Keller v. State, supra
note 43. See also Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 281 (1809) ; United
States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398 (1888); Maryland v. B. & O.R.R., 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 534 (1845).
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the case is pending.54 By its own terms the federal savings statute is limited
to saving convictions upon the repeal of the statute making the conduct
a crime.5 5 It was intended to "save" crimes from technical abatement such
as resulted in United States v. Tynen56 where an intervening statute
changed the penalty from "not less than 3 nor more than 5 years"5 7 to
imprisonment for "not less than one year and a fine not less than $300."8
Therefore, like the Maryland savings statute in Bell, the federal savings
statute was held inapplicable.
Prima facie then, the federal savings statute is not applicable. Further,
the federal savings statute only applies to saving convictions under federal,
not state criminal acts. Thus, in United States v. Chambers,59 the federal
savings statute was held inapplicable to crimes committed under the
National Prohibition Act which was rendered inoperative, not repealed, by
the twenty-first amendment, which also was not an act of Congress.60
Policy consideration can likewise put the savings statute in abeyance.
Section 203 of the Civil Rights Act, protecting the attempt to enforce the
rights secured by the act would have guarded petitioners from the state's
sanctions if the act had been in effect when they committed their criminal
trespass. The act intervened while the convictions were still on appeal
and even if the savings statute were prima facie applicable, section 203
would cause its non-exercise because "the [savings statute] must be
54 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1964), reads:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish
any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute unless the
repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as
still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The
expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or
extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute,
unless the temporary statute shall so expressly provide, and such statute
shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any
proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture,
or liability. 61 Stat. 635 (1947), 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
55 The Maryland saving statute was limited to "repeal," "repeal and re-enact-
ment," "revision," "amendment" or "consolidation" of a statute or any part of a
statute. See supra note 45.
56 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88 (1870).
57 Id. at 90.
58 Ibid.
59 291 U.S. 217 (1934).
60 The Court in Chambers said:
[T]his provision [saving statute] applies, and could only apply, to the repeal
of statutes by the Congress and to the exercise by the Congress of its un-
doubted authority to qualify its repeal and thus keep in force its own enact-
ments .... The Congress, however, is powerless to expand its constitutional
authority .... The National Prohibition Act was not repealed by an Act of
Congress but was rendered inoperative, so far as authority to enact its
provisions was derived by the Eighteenth Amendment, by the repeal, not by
the Congress, but by the people, of that Amendment.
291 U.S. at 224-25. See Massey v. United States, 291 U.S. 608 (1934).
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enforced unless either by express declaration or necessary implication, aris-
ing from the terms of the law, as a whole, it results that the legislative
mind will be set at naught by giving effect to the provisions of [the savings
statute]. '"61 The applicability of the saving statute having been thus im-
paired, the common law rule is left to operate upon these pending convic-
tions precisely in those situations for which it had been created, i.e., the
supervention of legislation removing or denying the crime before the
convictions become final on appeal.6 2 Always before, however, abatement
had operated only in the sphere of a single sovereignty, that is, English
law intervened upon English law ;63 federal law upon federal law ;64 and
state law upon state law.65 For the first time, then, the effect of the common
law rule resulted from the interplay of the statute of one sovereignty, the
federal government, upon the statute of other sovereignties-South Carolina
and Arkansas.
PREEMPTION
The Court chose the supremacy clause as the vehicle by which to
reach its result. The supremacy clause encompasses both quantitative and
qualitative tests for its application: quantitative determination of how far
the federal government has preempted a field of regulation and over-ridden
state law, and qualitative determination of what kinds of state interference
or duplication will be tolerated in areas which Congress has entered but
not foreclosed. Quantitatively, when the federal statute has been incomplete
in its regulation so that there is room for the state to operate with its
traditional police powers, the two sets of regulations can exist har-
moniously.6
61 Great No. Ry. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908).
62 The common law rule of abatement had its origins in English common law. See
Rex v. Cator, 4 Burrows 2026, 98 Eng. Reps. 56 (1767); King v. Davis, I Leach
Crown Cases 306, 168 Eng. Reps. 238 (1783).
63 See, e.g., Rex. v. Cator, supra note 62; King v. Davis, supra note 62.
64 See, e.g., United States v. The Schooner Peggy, supra note 52; Yeaton v.
United States, supra note 53; United States v. Reisinger, supra note 53; Maryland
v. B. & O.R.R., mpra note 53.
65 See, e.g., Keller v. State, supra note 43.
66 In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914), holding that
Georgia can require railroads to equip locomotives with headlights in the absence of
federal legislation, the Court said at 292:
If there is a conflict in such local regulations, by which interstate commerce
may be inconvenienced-if there appears to be need of standardization of safety
appliances and of providing rules of operation which will govern the entire
interstate road irrespective of state boundaries-there is a single remedy ....
That remedy does not rest in a denial to the State, in absence of conflicting
federal action, of its powers to protect life and property within its borders
but it does lie in the exercise of the paramount authority of Congress in
its control of interstate commerce to establish such regulations as in its
judgment may be deemed appropriate and sufficient.
In Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), holding that Washington may inspect
hulls of tugboats although there is a federal statute regulating tugboats which does
not call for inspection of hulls, the Court said at 9-13:
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The Court in Hamm was not concerned with the quantitative determi-
nation. The case does not raise the question whether the Civil Rights Act
preempted the field of public accommodations laws, thus invalidating state
statutes on the same subject.6 7 Rather, the Court was concerned with the
qualitative determination under the supremacy clause.
Qualitative determinations under the supremacy clause arise inde-
pendently of the question of federal occupation of a field. The quantitative
question is whether there was, in fact, a collision of federal and state
regulation, or in the alternative, whether the two systems may exist
together. The qualitative question is: Given a federal policy, whether it
preempts a field or not, what kind of state interference with that policy
will be endured? At the lower end of the scale are the easily disposed of
cases where a state statute clearly clashes with a federal statute and must
give way. 6 8
[T] here necessarily remains to the states, until Congress acts, a wide range
for the permissible exercise of power appropriate to their territorial juris-
diction although interstate commerce may be affected .... And when Congress
does exercise its paramount authority, it is obvious that Congress may deter-
mine how far its regulation shall go. There is no constitutional rule which
compels Congress to occupy the whole field.... [T]he exercise by the State
of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by Federal
action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so "direct and
positive" that the two acts cannot "be reconciled or consistently stand to-
gether." . . . [T]he state law touches that which the federal laws and regu-
lations have left untouched.
In DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), the Court held that New York can
regulate the persons entitled to collect dues from labor organizations without violat-
ing the National Labor Relations Act or the Labor Management Relations Act. See
also Rice v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947), holding that Illinois can
regulate trading in futures without violating the Commodity Exchange Act. Acts
which are criminal under both state and federal laws can be punished by both. United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (violation of Washington and federal pro-
hibition laws). See also Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847) (conviction
for violation of Ohio and federal laws on coinage). But when a congressional plan is
discerned as occupying the field, such as the Smith Act's effect upon sedition, there is
no room left for state regulation even if the state policy is only to supplement
federal regulations. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
67 There is probably room for both federal and state public accommodation
laws to operate harmoniously. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
68 In McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913), for example, the Court
held that Wisconsin law cannot require labeling of syrup in a way which clashes
with the Pure Food and Drug Act requirements. (Laws of Wisconsin 1907, § 4601
required the label "Glucose flavored with maple syrup" -while the Pure Food and
Drug Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), required the label "Corn syrup with cane flavoring").
State laws are invalid when they conflict with the constitutionally assigned
province of federal powers, such as the commerce clause, even absent federal statutory
law. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890), where a Minnesota fresh
meat inspection law was held to place a burden on interstate commerce in the
absence of federal legislation.
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Beyond the clearly discernible modes of conflict, the characterization
of state-federal conflicts show how much more tangentially state regula-
tion may brush against federal regulation. The focus is not upon whether
a state statute, administrative regulation, or other kind of state action
imposes itself upon paramount federal authority, but rather the focus is
upon how that state action touches the federal regulation: whether there
is a clear clash of both sovereigns attempting to regulate the same object,
or a state regulation of an entirely separate matter which only indirectly
interferes with an unconnected federal regulation.
Where the interest in an area is traditionally federal, a state's attempt
to supplement and enter the field is easily comprehended as being precluded
for lack of room.69 Moreover, even where the regulation that clashes with
federal law is within the police power of the state, traditionally allocated
to the state sphere, it still must give way, even though the police power
be otherwise valid.7 0
69 In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 66, the Court stated: "Federal statutes
'touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
[must] be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'"
350 U.S. at 504.
70 Thus, in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), it
was held that a state safety responsibility act denying the privilege of driving motor
vehicles when there is an unsatisfied judgment, cannot be given an effect which
would run contrary to the full privileges of a federal discharge in bankruptcy. The
Court there found a "clear collision with a national law which has the right of way
under the supremacy clause of Article VI." 369 U.S. at 172. The state cannot
impose an additional condition upon a privilege under federal protection, such as
registration of steamboats, though this regulation, if valid, would be within the
police powers. In Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859), the
Court stated:
[I]n the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a
case where the State law is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repug-
nance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two Acts could
not be reconciled or consistently stand together; and, also, that the act of
Congress should have been passed in the exercise of a clear power under
the Constitution ....
The state cannot protect private interests by offering additional remedies
where the federal act has given a remedy to protect the public interest and the
state cannot extend the federal law, the conflict lying in remedies not rights. Thus,
in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), the Court held that Pennsylvania
courts could not issue injunctions in labor disputes as Congress had given jurisdiction
exclusively to the National Labor Relations Board. The Court said, at 500-01:
We conclude that when Federal power constitutionally is exerted for the pro-
tection of public or private interests, or both, it becomes the supreme law
of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented or extended by a state
procedure merely because it will apply some doctrine of private right. To the
extent a private right may conflict with a public one, the former is superseded.
[Now changed by Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 701(a), 73
Stat. 519, 541 (1959), amending National Labor Relations Act § 14, 49 Stat. 457
(1935), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1964), allowing states to regulate where the
National Labor Relations Board has declined jurisdiction.] The state cannot give
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The State cannot pass legislation, the enforcement of which would
conflict with the administration of a federal program.71 Even where
Congress legislates in an area traditionally occupied by the states, a state
law is invalid where "the state policy may produce a result inconsistent
with the objective of the federal statute."72 This is true of even state
protection under its unfair competition law to something which is not validly pro-
tectable under federal patent laws. The Court, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964), said:
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the patent laws directly, it cannot, under
some other [state] law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give pro-
tection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws
.... [That] would be to permit the state to block off from the public some-
thing which federal law has said belongs to the public. ... This would be
too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.
(Emphasis added.)
The analogy to Hamm is obvious: the state cannot use that "some other state
law," the trespass statutes, to give protection to segregationists "of a kind that
clashes with objects" of the Civil Rights Act-equal availability of public accommo-
dations. Yet, there still remains, perhaps, a qualitative difference between the vray
state unfair competition laws encroaches on federal patent laws, and the way trespass
statutes affect the Civil Rights Act. The contact of the trespass laws with the Civil
Rights Act is more oblique than that of the unfair competition laws with the patent
laws. But the kind of encroachment the unfair competition laws illustrate is not the
only state interference that will not be tolerated. The manifold modes of state-federal
conflicts led Mr. Justice Black to remark:
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties
or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following
expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance;
difference; irreconciliability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and inter-
ference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional
test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis there can
be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to
determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case ... [the
state's] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). (Emphasis added.) On the other hand,
Chief Justice Taney said in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858):
And although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within its territorial
limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited and restricted by
the Constitution of the United States. And the power of the General Govern-
ment, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the
same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting
separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres.
And the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond
the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court,
as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to
the eye.
71 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 66.
72 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). (Emphasis
added.) See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), where the Court
said, in a case in which Florida was regulating labor unions by requiring the licens-
ing of business agents, who under Florida law, had to be a citizen for ten years:
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common law rules as seemingly insignificant as a rule of estoppel, when
it conflicts with a federal policy.73 Nor need there be an actual quantum
of conflict since state regulation imposing upon federal regulation can be
invalid where the state regulation "would create potential frustration of
national purposes."74
A continuum can thus be demarcated, ranging from actual conflict
where the state seeks to regulate conduct which is the subject of federal
regulation to situations where the state has brought to bear an unconnected
state policy called up from its traditional sphere of action which presents
only a potential clash with federal statutes. The scale has been run from
state interference with federal constitutional rights, federally protected
rights and privileges, to conflicts with something less than a right--conflict
with federal policy, inconsistent results, obstacles to implementation of
full purpose. In all of these cases federal regulation is supreme; state
intervention will not be tolerated whenever it runs afoul of the federal
scheme, even when the state has used only those tools of intervention which
comprise a part of its traditional police powers.
Where, then, does Hamm fit into this scale of state-federal conflicts?
Harm becomes the farthest point noted to date on this continuum. Hamr
shows the use of traditional trespass laws, which have always been within
The requirement as to the filing of information and the payment of a$1.00 annual fee does not, in and of itself, conflict with the Federal Act. But
for failure to comply, this union has been enjoined from functioning as a
labor union . . . . It is the sanction here imposed, and not the duty to
report, which brings about a situation inconsistent with the federally protected
process of collective bargaining.
325 U.S. at 543.
73 Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). The Court said at 176:
It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may not
be set at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state common
law rules. In such a case our decision is not controlled by Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. There we followed state law because it was the law
to be applied in the federal courts. But the doctrine of that case is inappli-
cable to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of the law is
so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they
affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those
statutes, rather than by local law ....
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and
nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by the
statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the
answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy
which it had adopted. To the federal statute and policy conflicting state law
and policy must yield. Constitution, Art. VI.
See Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301, 307 (1964), in which the Court stated: "The
issuance of the State injunction in this case tended to frustrate this federal policy.
This would be true even if the picketing were prohibited conduct." (Emphasis added.)
74 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
(Emphasis added.) The Court held that the state cannot regulate union activities with
its unfair practices laws even when the National Labor Relations Board has declined
jurisdiction because the amount of interstate commerce was small.
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the sphere of state, not federal prerogatives, to affect and frustrate national
policy. Its boldness lies in the fact that the federal government intervenes
after the convictions. Here is no ancient state sanction suddenly revived in
a new manner to frustrate an established federal policy; rather, it is the
use of an existing state sanction preceding the federal policy, which up
until the passage of the federal act, and even now in areas in which it will
not brush against the federal act, was and is still valid. Hereafter the
trespass laws are still valid, except when used to frustrate the Civil Rights
Act.
The supremacy clause, as we have seen, may require state action to
fall no matter how it conflicts with federal policy, and no matter how
indirectly it may interfere. The problem then becomes one of timing. But
certainly timing must cease to be vexatious when it is realized that these
convictions were still pending when the Civil Rights Act became effective.
Sit-in convictions under trespass laws at that time, during the pendency
of the cases, were in conflict with the national purpose and placed an
obstacle in the path of full realization of the benefits of the federal act. So,
it does not matter how correctly Mr. Justice Harlan announces that past
convictions cannot affect present commerce. The Civil Rights Act is not
merely a regulation of commerce under which intrusions on the flow of
commerce become the test of invalidity of state interference. The Civil
Rights Act represents more when viewed through the supremacy clause.
It becomes the supreme law of the land and interference with its policy,
program, or full purpose, in any degree must fall. At the time the Supreme
Court reviewed Hamm's conviction, the Civil Rights Act was the para-
mount law, and at that time the trespass laws tended to frustrate its
effectiveness. 75
75 Hainrn is not the only situation in which blockading efforts by southern
states in order to nullify federal equalitarian principles have failed. After the
Supreme Court announced its famous school desegration opinion in Brown v. The
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the people of Arkansas passed a con-
stitutional amendment commanding the legislature of that state to oppose that
decision. Pursuant to that amendment the legislature enacted a law to relieve children
from compulsory attendance at desegregated schools. In accordance with the new
law the governor sent Arkansas National Guardsmen to bar Negroes from the schools.
This Arkansas law was held invalid. The Court in dealing with these affronts to
national purpose said in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-18:
In short, the Constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against
in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in
the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators
or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through
evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted "ingeniously or ingenu-
ously...."
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme
Law of the Land".... It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law
of the land....
Thus no matter how circuitous and formally correct the interference is, if the
state action conflicts in substance, it is invalid.
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A FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ARGuMENT
Even absent Hamm state trespass laws could not be used in the future
to block the effectiveness of section 203 of the Civil Rights Act. The
decision governs only the disposition of trespass cases pending on passage
of the act. Even to activists it must seem unwise to break new ground in a
field so subject to controversy as is federal preemption, especially if there
is another ground on which to achieve the same result. The Court had at
its disposal a more appropriate argument in light of the 1963 and 1964
civil rights cases, i.e., equal protection.
In Garner v. Louisiana,76 the Court reversed, for lack of evidence, a
breach of peace conviction of Negroes who attempted to obtain restaurant
service. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion,77 put forth an
equal protection argument that found state action through custom. He
argued that, although Louisiana did not have a statute requiring segrega-
tion in restaurant facilities, the state did have statutes requiring separate
entrances for circuses, shows, and tent exhibitions ;78 segregation of dancing,
social functions, entertainment, athletic training, games, sports, contests,
and other activities which require social contacts ;79 separate seating and
sanitary drinking water at public entertainment or athletic contests;80
segregation in prisons ;81 segregation of the blind ;82 segregation on trains ;83
separate waiting rooms and reception rooms to be maintained by common
carriers ;84 separate toilet and drinking water facilities to be maintained by
common carriers ;s5 separate sanitary facilities to be maintained by employ-
ers,86 as well as separate eating rooms and separate eating and drinking
utensils for employees ;87 court dockets to reveal the race of the parties in
divorce actions ;8a and segregation at all public parks, recreation centers,
and playgrounds where recreational activities are conducted. 9 Louisiana
also bans interracial marriages ;90 forbids teachers in public schools91 and
other state employees 92 to advocate desegregation of the public school
system; and bars one race from establishing homes in a community of
another race without approval of the majority of the race. 3
76 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
77 368 U.S. at 178.
78 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:5 (1950).
79 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:451 (Supp. 1964).
80 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:452 (Supp. 1964).
81 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:752 (1950).
82 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:10 (1963).
83 L.a. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:528, 45:532 (1950).
84 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:1301 (Supp. 1964).
85 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:1303 (Supp. 1964).
86 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:971 (1964).
87 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:972 (1964).
88 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:917 (1950).
89 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:4558.1 (Supp. 1964).
90 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:79 (1950).
01 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:443, 17:462 (1963).
02 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:523 (1963).
93 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:5066 (1950).
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Such statutes, argued Mr. Justice Douglas, establish a custom of the
state, which is enough state action, through its coercive effect on restaurant
owners to segregate, that the fourteenth amendment can apply to trans-
actions affected by the laws. The argument, however, went unheeded. Yet
in the 1964 case of Robinson v. Florida,94 though Florida did not have a
statute requiring segregation in restaurants, there was a Florida Board of
Health regulation 95 requiring separate toilet and lavatory facilities where
Negroes are employed or accommodated. This, the Court held, was a state
policy putting a direct burden on the restaurant owners to segregate.98 The
direct burden would be caused, of course, by the fact that it is cheaper to
maintain a segregated restaurant than to incur the cost of building and
maintaining separate toilets. One can only guess how this burden differs
from the Louisiana requirements that employers provide separate sanitary
facilities as well as separate rooms and eating utensils, which Mr. Justice
Douglas pointed out in Garner. The Florida regulation would not "burden"
a restaurant owner into maintaining a segregated restaurant if he hires
Negroes and thus must maintain the separate facilities anyway. The state
policy expressed through the Florida regulation surely does not burden
the restaurant owner more than the cumulative effect of the seventeen
Louisiana statutes. It would be a nice distinction that could separate such
direct from indirect burdens.
The facts in Hamm would have been receptive to a resurrection of
Mr. Justice Douglas' state-action-through-custom argument,97 for Arkansas
requires segregation in railroads,98 waiting rooms,99 streetcars,' ° ° buses,101
schools, 10 2 penal institutions, 0 3 deaf and blind institutions, 0 4 chain gang
eating and sleeping facilities, 0 5 and gambling establishments. 10 6 South
Carolina requires segregation in station restaurants, 0 7 railroads and steam-
boats, 0 8 streetcars, 0 9 chain gangs,"10 circuses,"' colleges, 1 2 textile facto-
94 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
95 Fla. Adm. Code, C 170(c), § 8.06.
98 378 U.S. at 156.
97 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 46-51, Harem v. City of Rock Hill, 377 U.S. 988
(1964).
98 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 73-1218 (1957).
99 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 73-1218 (1957).
100 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 73-1614 (1957).
101 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 73-1747 (1957).
102 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-509 (1960).
103 Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 46-144, 46-145 (1964).
104 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-2401 (1960).
105 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 76-1119 (1957).
108 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-2724 (1960).
107 S.C. Code Ann. § 58-551 (1962).
108 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 58-714, 58-719, 58-720 (1962).
109 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 58-1331, 58-1340 (1962).
110 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 55-1, 55-2 (1962).
1l S.C. Code Ann. § 5-19 (1962).
112 S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3 (1962).
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ries,1 3 parks n1 4 and schools." 5 Thus the argument could be made that
South Carolina and Arkansas, like Louisiana, put a burden upon the
restaurant owner by state participation through custom which these statutes
reflect. The fine line between Harn and Robinson, just as between Garner
and Robinson, would be no obstacle to a finding that there was, indeed, state
action enough to violate the equal protection clause. This position is
bolstered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which adopts Mr. justice Douglas'
concept of state-action-through-custom in section 201(d) which declares:
Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is sup-
ported by State action within the meaning of this title if such
discrimination or segregation . . . (2) is carried on under color
of any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the
state or political subdivision thereof .... 116
Custom as reflected in those statutes being the necessary state action
should justify reversal of the convictions as a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. The pendency of the appeals would thus cause abatement
without the seeking of a new application of the supremacy clause and thus
avoid the criticism directed at the uneasiness that such a course will bring.
CONCLUSION
Congress carved out a set of circumstances-attempts to enforce
sections 201 and 202 of the act-to which state laws could not apply to
negative those federal rights and privileges. The innovation in Harmin was
that the conduct incurring the state penalty happened before federal author-
ity was exerted in the area. But because convictions are not final until the
highest reviewing court has passed upon them, the Court could hold that
the common law rule of abatement obtained where intervening legislation
removed the crime while the convictions are still pending. Moreover, for
the first time federal law intervened upon state convictions and the Court
expanded the applicability of the common law rule of abatement. To
justify this use of abatement, the Court turned to the supremacy clause.
The Court, by choosing the supremacy clause as the rationale for
reversal of the trespass convictions, expanded the present boundaries of
supremacy application." 7 Hamm was not a direct intrusion of state law
11 S.C. Code Ann. § 40-452 (1962).
114 S.C. Code Ann. § 51-2.1 (1962). The statute was held unconstitutional in
Brown v. South Carolina State Forestry Comm'n., 226 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.S.C. 1963),
and then amended in 1964 to eliminate the segregation provision.
11L S.C. Code Ann. § 21-751 (1962). The statutes cited in notes 104-21 supra,
appear in Brief for Petitioners, pp. 47-48, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, supra note 97.
I have reprinted this summary of Arkansas and South Carolina statutes substantially
unchanged from the brief, taking the liberty of numbering the footnotes so to be
consecutive in the scheme of this article.
116 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(d) (1964).
117 But a place in a string citation is not the only reward Hamm will have.
The field of labor law is much vexed with state-federal problems. Pickets, protected
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into an area where federal authority had been operating, rather it was a
traditional area of state law enforcement-keeping the peace through
enforcement of criminal trespass statutes-into which federal law thrust
itself. Hamm did not involve direct conflict of the state statutes with a
federal statute; rather, the decision forbids only the application of these
laws where that application would frustrate a clearly expressed federal
policy. The criminal trespass laws of Arkansas and South Carolina remain
valid and subsisting except when applied to persons attempting to enforce
privileges granted by the Civil Rights Act.
Despite the lawyer-like skill and statesmanlike moderation which lie
behind Harne's resolution, federalism might, in the long run, have been
better served by disposing of these appeals and their successors under the
equal protection clause until the passage of time and the Civil Rights Act
insure that the conflicts which underlie cases like Hamm are on their way
toward abatement.
by the Labor Management Relations Act in their demonstrations, have also run
afoul of state trespass statutes. The question arose whether they are immune from
arrest or injunction since they are federally protected. The Supreme Court left this
question open in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
In similar fact situation, state courts both have and have not enforced their state's
trespass statutes against pickets. Compare People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174
N.E.2d 385 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961), with Schwartz-Torrance Inv.
Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 40 Cal. Rptr. 223, 394 P.2d 921 (1964);
Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees, 16 Wis. 2d 496, 144 N.W.2d 876 (1962).
See In re Zerbe 60 Cal. 2d 666, 36 Cal. Rptr. 286, 388 P2d 182 (1964) ; Clothing
Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963);
Freeman v. Retail Clerks, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961). The effect of a
federal act on state trespass statutes as shown in Harem should no longer leave that
question open to doubt.
